Following™ the Civil War, emigration to the west increased significantly over the Oregon-California trail. Troubles from the Northern Plains Indians on the wagon trains caused considerable concern for the emigrants putting their lives on the line to move west. The U.S. Army in the west had been reduced to a shell as a result of the Civil War and protection for the new settlers was lacking. Not all of the Indians in the Northern Plains were warlike but the tribes of Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho and Kiowa continued to raid and harass the emigrants.
In early 1866 there were only six regular cavalry regiments, 19 regular infantry regiments and five regular artillery regiments. The need for additional cavalry and infantry regiments was obvious if the army was to provide any protection for the emigrants. In July 1866 President Andrew Johnson signed the “Act to Increase and Fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States.” The act increased the cavalry regiments from six to ten and the infantry regiments from 19 to 45. The total authorized strength of the army was about 54,000—a significant increase over the 18,000 prewar army.
A cavalry regiment consisted of 12 companies and an infantry regiment had 10 companies. The cavalry regiments were commanded by a colonel and were authorized a lieutenant colonel, three majors, and a captain, 1st lieutenant and 2nd lieutenant for each company. The infantry regiment had basically the same command structure except was authorized only one major. The size of each company of cavalry or infantry could vary from 50 to 100, the size to be determined by the War Department.
Of the four new cavalry regiments, two were to be all white (the 7th and 8th) and two (the 9th and 10th) were to be black except for white officers. Almost all of the officers selected to staff the regiments were Civil War veterans of which there was an abundant supply. It was necessary to filter out those officers who had only performed marginally during the past conflict. Reductions in rank were commonplace—officers who had commanded volunteer units reverted back to their regular ranks. In was not unusual for generals and colonels to revert back to the rank of major, captain and even lieutenant.
The west was divided into two military geographical commands—the Division of the Missouri and the Division of the Pacific—basically separated by the continental divide. Each division was then divided into military departments. The Division of the Missouri consisted of the Department of the Missouri which included Colorado, Kansas, Missouri and New Mexico; the Department of the Platte which included Nebraska, Utah, Iowa and parts of Dakota and Montana Territories; and the Department of Dakota which included Minnesota and the remaining parts of Dakota and Montana Territories. The Division of the Pacific was broken down into two departments—the Department of California which included California, Arizona and Nevada, and the Department of the Columbia that contained Oregon, Idaho and Washington.
Following the Indian Treaty of 1868 with which the government assumed most of the Indian troubles were over, the appropriations for the army were cut that resulted in a significant reduction in personnel. By 1874 the army had been reduced from an authorized high of 54,000 to just 27,000. There were no cuts in the number of cavalry regiments but infantry regiments were cut from 45 to 25.
Officer’s salaries were less than those by men in comparable civilian positions. Annual pay ranged from about $3,500 for a colonel to about $1,500 for a 2nd lieutenant in the cavalry. Promotions for both the cavalry and infantry officers were few and far between—each rank level was only authorized a fixed number of officers. Promotion came only with the removal of a more senior officer by death, promotion, dismissal or retirement. Enlistment pay was equally poor: $13 per month for a private to $22 per month for a line sergeant. Desertion among the enlisted personnel reached staggering proportions—for the period between 1867 and 1890 about one-third deserted.
Training of new recruits was almost non-existent. There were three recruit depots, one at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, for cavalry and the other two for infantry at David’s Island, New York and Columbus Barracks, Ohio. Lack of manpower and money prevented any type of realistic training. Many of the recruits could not speak English and there were always a number of men who enlisted under assumed names, either to escape from the law or a bad marriage. A percentage of those assigned to the cavalry had little riding skills and limited marksmanship with cavalry weapons. The lack of ammunition prevented those men assigned to the infantry to acquire any type of shooting skills. These were the men who were sent west to populate the cavalry and infantry regiments stationed on the Northern Plains.
For the regiments stationed on the western plains there were two basic tasks required of the army—protect the emigrant trains and settlers as they moved westward and provide protection for the railroad surveyors and track builders.
The frontier army soldier usually found himself at an isolated army post living in an overcrowded, poorly built barracks and having to share his straw-filled mattress with another soldier. Strict discipline would be brutally enforced and punishment hard and often cruel. Every day was much the same boring routine—drill and perform tasks that took little skill. Whiskey and gambling were among the few pleasures enjoyed by the soldiers, both leading to destructive conclusions for many soldiers. Desertion from the western posts was rampant with some regiments losing as many as 40% of their enlisted personnel in a single year.
Combat with the various Indian tribes on the Northern Plains was rare—the Indians would use hit-and-run tactics to steal horses or kill isolated settlers. Attacks by large numbers of Indians were rare and only occurred when the warriors were assured of overwhelming odds. Attacks by the army on Indian villages were also rare as the Indians moved frequently and were difficult to find in fixed locations. Only during the winter months were the location of the Indian villages fixed for any length of time. If the army did attack an Indian village, the Indian warriors would hold off the army until the non-combatants were safely out of harm’s way, then the warriors would scatter. Army pursuit was usually quickly abandoned as the Indians could move much more quickly on their grass-feed ponies than the army could on their grain-feed, heavier horses.
The majority of serious conflicts between the army and the Northern Plains Indians took place between 1873 and 1877. Custer fought a pitched battle with the Indians during the 1873 Yellowstone expedition. In 1876 a number of battles occurred in what became known at the Great Sioux War and included skirmishes at Powder River, Rosebud Creek, Little Big Horn, War Bonnet Creek, Cabin Creek, Slim Buttes and Redwater. The following year saw conflicts, among others, at Canyon Creek, Wolf Mountain, Bear Paw Mountain and Big Hole. The final significant engagement between the army and the Sioux occurred at Wounded Knee in 1890.
Source:
© 2003 Broken Arrow Books: United States Army in the Western Indian Wars (1966-1890)
http://www.custerbooks.com/frontierarmy.htm
Army Soldier
This vocation can also be used for ex-soldiers.
As settlers moved into the West, army regiments were right alongside them. Troopers and their horses face hostile Indians and desperate outlaws. In addition, the soldier’s five year commitment consists of extended patrols of up to six months covering more than 1,000 miles, build roads and bridges, discourage illegal trades of guns and alcohol to Indians, police rustlers, and form escorts for stagecoaches carrying military payroll and other valuables.
VOCATIONAL SKILLS
Firearms
Riding
Survival
Knife Fighting
Composure
Intimidation
REQUIRED GIMMICKS
Federal Authority
Scout
Men who know the lore of the plains and mountains and Indian ways, used by the U.S. Army as guides. The frontiersmen, trappers, and cowboys often are employed as civilian contract scouts. Their duties could range from guide, hunter, and courier to interpreter, intelligence officer and diplomat. Most of them had learned their ways from the Indians and can travel independently of compass points or geography. Scouts know the best trails like the back of their hand. They can spot the faint outline of a hoof print or a freshly broken twig. They can hear the call of an eagle or the sound of footsteps. Nothing escapes the scout’s senses. They know the location of obscure watering places on the prairies. They know every survival skill and can find water and food when none exist. They can even sense danger.
VOCATIONAL SKILLS
Firearms
Riding
Survival
Western Lore
Tracking
Negotiation
REQUIRED GIMMICKS
Internal Compass
Life in the Frontier Army
One of the determining factors about life in the U.S. Army on the frontiers of America was the small size of the force engaged in operations in relative isolation from the country and from the rest of the Army. The Army was scattered throughout hundreds of small forts, posts, outposts, and stations throughout the American West, often with little more than a company of cavalry or infantry in each post. This isolation bred, on one hand, a strong sense of camaraderie, of bonding, within the Army in a way that only shared suffering can do. The officers and men often felt part of an extended family that had to look inward for strength as it relied on its own customs, rituals, and sense of honor separate from that distant civilian world or even from the very different military society “back East.” This sense of unity, of “splendid isolation,” kept the Army as an institution together during the harsh missions of western frontier duty but at the same time led far too often to professional and personal stagnation. Promotion was slow, and chances for glory were few given the dangers and hardships of small-unit actions against an elusive foe.
The isolation also bred a certain measure of reliance upon each other, as officers and soldiers developed various customs and rituals to bring structure to their lives. The formal rituals of a frontier post-life regulated by bugle calls, formal parades, Saturday night dances for the officers, distinctive uniforms, and unit nicknames were attempts to deal with the tensions and pressures of a harsh life for a soldier and his family with low pay and little prestige. While perhaps glamorous in retrospect, or when seen through the eye of Hollywood movies, such small communities also had their share of drunkenness, petty squabbles, corruption, arguments over rank and quarters, and other seemingly minor disputes so well known by any who have experienced life in small-town America. It was a life at once dangerous and monotonous, comradely and isolated, professionally rewarding and stultifying. With low pay, poor quarters, an indifferent public, and a skilled foe that was at once feared, hated, and admired, the officers and men of the frontier Army seemed caught in a never-ending struggle with an elusive enemy and their environment. One historian summarized the Army post during this period on the frontier this way: “If one description could alone fit all frontier posts, it would be a monotonous routine relaxed only slightly by the color of periodic ceremony.” This shared culture created many of the institutional myths and customs that continue to influence the Army’s image of itself to this day.
The manpower strains of all the various missions after the Civil War plus manning all the frontier posts and stations badly strained the resources of a shrinking Regular Army. As the post-Civil War Army took shape, its strength began a decade of decline, dropping from an 1867 level of 57,000 to half that in 1876, then leveling off at an average of 26,000 for the remaining years up to the War with Spain. Effective strength always lay somewhere below authorized strength, seriously impaired by high rates of sickness and desertion, for example. Because the Army’s military responsibilities were of continental proportions, involving sweeping distances, limited resources, and far-flung operations, an administrative structure was required for command and control. The Army was, therefore, organized on a territorial basis, with geographical segments variously designated as divisions, departments, and districts. There were frequent modifications of organization, rearrangements of boundaries, and transfers of troops and posts to meet changing conditions.
Development of a basic defense system in the trans-Mississippi West had followed the course of empire. Territorial acquisition and exploration succeeded by emigration and settlement brought the settlers increasingly into collision with the Indians and progressively raised the need for military posts along the transcontinental trails and in settled areas.
Source:
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY VOLUME 1: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE FORGING OF A NATION, 1775-1917; Richard W. Stewart General Editor
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V1/
WINNING THE WEST: THE ARMY IN THE INDIAN WARS 1865-1890
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V1/ch14.htm
A very cool map of some posts, tribes, and battles of the Indian Wars 1860-1890 from
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V1/Map35.jpg
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